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Ellerin v. Fairfax 
Savings, F.S.B.: 
ACTUAL 
KNOWLEDGE OF A 
MISREPRESENTA-
TION, COUPLED 






FOR ANA WARD 
OF PUNITIVE 
DAMAGES IN 
A TORT ACTION 
OF FRAUD. 
In an opinion that gave 
an extensive review of fraud 
. and the concept of punitive dam-
ages, the Court of Appeals of 
Maryland determined the ap-
propriate standard for an award 
of punitive damages in a tort 
action of fraud. In Ellerin v. 
Fairfax Savings, PSB., 337 
Md. 216,652A.2d 1117 (1995), 
the court of appeals held that a 
person's actual knowledge of 
falsity, coupled with an intent 
to deceive by way of the false-
hood, established the actual 
malice required for the avail-
ability of punitive damages in 
an action of fraud. 
Charles Ellerin and 
Louis Seidel ("Ellerin") fi-
nanced a commercial real es-
tate development through 
Fairfax Savings, F. S.B. 
("Fairfax"). In order to secure 
its loan, Fairfax required Ellerin 
to personally guarantee the 
project. It was undisputed that 
the final guarantees signed at 
the settlement were different 
from earlier drafts approved by 
Ellerin. Although Ellerin would 
not have been liable under the 
approved drafts, he was liable, 
after subsequent default, under 
the guarantees signed at settle-
ment. Fairfax's attorneys in-
sisted that the addition of ex-
tended liability, to the final guar-
antees, was unintentional. 
Fairfax filed suit in the 
Circuit Court for Baltimore 
County for repayment of the 
loan. Ellerin counterclaimed, 
asserting that Fairfax had fraud-
ulently changed the guarantees. 
The jury found Fairfax's ac-
tions fraudulent. However, the 
jury also found that Ellerin rat-
ified the fraud by continued per-
formance. As such, summary 
judgment was granted in favor 
of Fairfax. The court of special 
appeals reversed and remand-
ed, holding that Ellerin's con-
tinued performance did not pre-
clude him from damages based 
on fraud. The second trial end-
ed in a hung jury. At the third 
trial, the only inquiry concern-
ing fraud was Ellerin's knowl-
edge, at the signing, of changes 
made to the guarantees. The 
trial court held that, as a matter 
of law, Ellerin had ratified the 
guarantees and was liable. 
In the damages phase, 
undertaken to ascertain 
Fairfax's liability in the fraud 
action, the jury awarded both 
compensatory and punitive 
damages. The trial court de-
nied Fairfax's requestto instruct 
the jury with respect to the mal-
ice necessary for punitive dam-
ages, since, in the court's view, 
actual malice was inherent in 
the elements of fraud. Fairfax 
appealed to the Court of Spe-
cial Appeals of Maryland which 
affirmed the compensatory 
damages, but vacated the puni-
tive damages award. The inter-
mediate appellate court held that 
the jury should have been in-
structed as to the element of 
malice necessary to support an 
award of punitive damages, and 
ordered a new trial. Fairfax's 
petition for a writ of certiorari, 
concerning its liability for com-
pensatory damages, was denied 
by the court of appeals. Ellerin's 
petition for a writ of certiorari, 
challenging the new trial on pu-
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nitive damages, was granted. 
Beginning its analysis, 
the Court of Appeals of Mary-
land reviewed the justification 
for the imposition of punitive 
damages, that is, to "punish and 
deter" the actions of a wrong-
doer. The court highlighted the 
character of the defendant's 
conduct as the determining fac-
tor for the imposition of puni-
tive damages. Citing the stan-
dard for punitive damages in 
non-intentional tort cases, the 
court held that the conduct of 
the defendant will be deemed 
sufficiently heinous when 
"characterized by evil motive, 
intent to injure, ill will, or fraud, 
i. e. 'actual malice. '" Ellerin, 
337 Md at 229, 652 A.2d at 
1123 (quoting Owens-Illinios 
v. Zenobia, 325 Md. 420, 460, 
601 A.2d 633, 652 (1992)). 
Analyzing the tort of 
fraud, as related to the punitive 
damages requirement of actual 
malice, the court emphasized 
the elements of intent and 
knowledge. In an action for 
fraud, the defendant must have 
knowledge of the falsity and a 
"deliberate intent to deceive" 
based on the falsehood. Id at 
230, 652 A.2d at 1124. The 
knowledge element of fraud, 
that the falsehood was actually 
known or that the defendant 
offered the misrepresentation 
with reckless indifference as to 
its truth, was clarified by the 
court. Id at 232, 652 A.2d at 
1124. As the court explained, a 
defendant will be "liable in a 
tort action of fraud only if he 
knows the misrepresentation 
was false or was recklessly in-
different in the sense that he 
knows he lacks knowledge as 
to its truth or falsity." Id at232, 
652 A.2d at 1125. 
Considering that puni-
tive damages must be based on 
a defendant's conscious wrong-
doing, the court qualified the 
knowledge element of fraud 
with respect to punitive damag-
es. The court held thataIthough 
the defendant's reckless disre-
gard of the truth or falsity of a 
representation satisfies the 
knowledge element of fraud, it 
does not meet the mens rea stan-
dard of actual knowledge re-
quired for an award of punitive 
damages. Id at 235, 652 A.2d 
at 1126. However, the court 
held that fraud, committed by a 
defendant who knows his rep-
resentation is false, equates to 
the "deliberate wrongdoing and 
evil motive" that justifies the 
award of punitive damages. Id. 
Therefore, the basis for puni-
tive damages, in an action of 
fraud, is actual knowledge of 
the falsity ofthe representation, 
coupled with an intent to use 
such a falsehood to deceive. Id 
at 240, 652 A.2d at 1129. Such 
a finding of actual knowledge, 
as opposed to reckless indiffer-
ence, satisfies the actual malice 
requirement for an award of pu-
nitive damages. Id 
The court vacated the 
award of punitive damages and 
ordered a new trial concerning 
such damages. Id. at 241, 652 
A.2d at 1129. The court re-
quired that the jury be instruct-
ed as to the elements of fraud, 
and that the trial court note the 
actual knowledge and reckless 
indifference distinction central 
to the Ellerin decision. Id 
In dicta, the court also 
provided the trial court some 
"guidance" as to the issue of 
excessive punitive damages. 
The court stated that, upon re-
quest, the jury should be in-
structed that the amount of pu-
nitive damages should not be 
disproportionate to the wrong-
fulness of the conduct or the 
ability of the defendant to pay. 
Id at 242,652 A.2d at 1130. In 
a final footnote, the court anal-
ogized the amount of punitive 
damages to maximum criminal 
fines, stating that the trial court 
"may consider the legislative 
policy reflected" in such stat-
utes. Id at 242 n.13, 652 A.2d 
at 1130. 
Although he concurred 
with the majority's opinion, re-
garding the necessity of actual 
malice in a fraud action, Judge 
Bell dissented as to the distinc-
tion between actual knowledge 
and reckless indifference. Id at 
244,652 A.2d at 1130 (Bell, J., 
dissenting). He reasoned that 
the requisite mental state nec-
essary for punitive damages is 
inherent in the elements of fraud, 
and, as such, the distinction 
outlined by the court is unnec-
essary. Id Judge Bell also 
questioned the propriety of the 
majority's analogy, to criminal 
fines, as adding unnecessary 
confusion to the jury instruc-
tions. Id at 247, 652 A.2d at 
1132. 
In drawing a distinction 
between the two knowledge el-
ements offraud, and the requi-
site mens rea for an award of 
- - --------- ---------- ... 
punitive damages, Ellerin v. 
Fairfax, clarifies the relation-
ship between two seemingly 
settled areas of law. The law, 
its elements, and the standards 
by which it is measured, are in 
constant need of refinement and 
interpretation. However, 
whereas the standard for pu-
ni ti ve damages in a fraud ac-
tion is more focused, the value 








of the court's dicta, on exces-
sive punitive damages, is un-
known. The lack of an author-
itative judicial decision may fur-
ther confuse the issue. Adding 
another variable to the equation 
does not solve the problem. 
However, consideration ofleg-
islative policy may lay the foun-
dation for an effective judicial 
tool regarding the reasonable-
In a case of first impres-
sion, the Court of Appeals of 
Maryland held that a paternity 
action brought by a mother, then 
dismissed with prejudice, does 
not necessarily bar a subsequent 
paternity action brought by the 
child. Of even more impor-
tance, the court's ruling inJes-
sica G. v. Hector M, 337 Md. 
388, 653 A.2d 922 (1995) 
broadly construed Family Law 
Code, section 5-1038(b), to al-
low the modification or setting 
aside of all paternity orders ex-
cept declarations of paternity. 
Thus, even an order terminat-
ing litigation, such as a dis-
missal with prejudice, can be 
set aside and the paternity issue 
relitigated by the child's subse-
quent paternity action. 
In March 1985, Joyce 
G. and Hector M. had an inti-
mate relationship. In Decem-
ber of that same year, Joyce 
gave birth to Jessica G. Soon 
after Jessica's birth, Joyce filed 
a paternity action against Hec-
tor in the Circuit Court for 
Harford County. Blood tests of 
the three parties indicated that 
there was a 99.97% chance that 
ness of punitive damages 
awards. 
Nevertheless, given the 
precarious political climate, at 
the state and national level, con-
cerning tort reform and puni-
tive damages, it is encouraging 
that the issue of excessive puni-
tive damages has entered the 
judicial discussion. 
- Terrence J Daly 
Hector was Jessica's father. 
Nonetheless, Hector refused to 
admit paternity. Aftertwoyears 
of prolonged discovery, Joyce 
asked to stop the paternity ac-
tion. A consent order to dis-
miss the action with prejudice 
was drafted and signed by all 
parties but Joyce. When the 
Assistant State's Attorney ex-
plained the meaning of with 
prejudice, Joyce refused to sign 
the order. However, in March 
1988, the State's Attorney dock-
eted the consent order. 
Joyce tried repeatedly 
to continue the paternity action. 
She filed another paternity suit 
in the Family Court of New 
York. The New York court 
dismissed the action, relying 
solely on the 1988 Harford 
County dismissal with preju-
dice. While Joyce was pursu-
ing various avenues of appeal, 
Jessica filed a paternity action 
against Hector in the Circuit 
Court for Harford County. 
Hectorresponded by fil-
ing a motion to dismiss Jessi-
ca's action based on the doc-
trineofresjudicata. Thecircuit 
court found that Joyce was rep-
